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Since the New Deal, courts and federal energy regulators have applied 
a preemption ceiling to the setting of wholesale electric power prices.  This 
price ceiling advances the statutory goal of protecting consumers from 
the ills of monopoly, including state regulation that increases an electric 
utility’s wholesale prices to favor in-state consumers at the expense of out-
of-state consumers.  Contrary to the ceiling preemption approach that 
has predominated regulation of electric power, this Article argues that to 
the extent that modern energy law statutes advance a more diverse set of 
values, such as conservation and fuel diversity, federal energy law needs 
to reassess application of wholesale price ceiling preemption to regional, 
state, and local innovation in clean energy policy. 
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Both appellate courts and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(“FERC”)—the primary federal agency responsible for implementing clean 
energy policies in the electric power sector—have recently applied price 
preemption principles to clean energy policies.  As states today consider 
how to encourage clean energy investments, they are increasingly bumping 
into limitations under federal law.  Under the Supremacy Clause of the 
U.S. Constitution, some state incentives for renewable energy face potential 
limitations to the extent that they present obstacles to the pursuit of 
federal policies.  The pro-preemption approach emphasizes a singular 
statutory goal and imposes a legal ceiling on the innovations of sub-national 
governments in setting prices to advance conservation goals. 
Part I of this Article provides an illustration of the feed-in tariff—one 
clean energy innovation many state and municipal governments have 
enacted to encourage investment in renewable energy.  In a nutshell, the 
feed-in tariff is a secure contract for renewable power at a set price over 
a term of years that provides a return to investors in these projects, such 
as a homeowner installing a solar panel or wind turbine.  Part II of this 
Article describes preemption issues that have risen with feed-in tariffs 
under two federal statutes—the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 
1978, which requires utilities to purchase power from certain renewable 
sources, and the Federal Power Act (adopted in 1935), which requires 
just and reasonable rates.  FERC’s unequivocally pro-preemption position 
echoes judicial decisions that endorse consumer protection and wholesale 
market objectives over other goals in energy policy, allowing these to 
serve as a ceiling for state pricing of renewable power.  Part II also 
highlights the impacts these decisions have on the efficacy of state feed-
in tariffs and their inconsistency with subsidies that are not preempted. 
In Part III, I argue that this pro-preemption position regarding feed-in 
tariffs may provide clear answers to federal-state power issues in this 
narrow context, but such clarity comes at a cost.  A preemption analysis 
of state clean energy policies requires identification of the relevant federal 
law and its purposes, as well as an evaluation of whether state law advances 
or impedes these purposes.  The history and purposes of federal energy 
statutes not only include consumer protection and competition in wholesale 
markets, but also include goals of conservation, efficiency, and fuel 
diversity, as well as goals related to energy independence and security.  
Recognizing a diversity of goals in energy law has important implications 
for both FERC and states as they forge policies such as feed-in tariffs to 
encourage renewable power and other clean energy issues, including 
cost recovery for high-voltage transmission lines and demand response 
measures aimed at conservation.  Emphasis on a singular consumer 
protection goal favors treating federal law as a preemption ceiling, rather 
than a floor—a methodology that limits the ability of energy law to 
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incorporate conservation and efficiency goals.  More consistent recognition 
of these diverse goals of energy laws would facilitate treating federal 
law as a statutory floor rather than a ceiling for setting prices, better 
allowing sub-national governments to innovate in their clean energy 
policies. 
I.  THE INNOVATION OF STATE AND MUNICIPAL FEED-IN TARIFFS 
Given that there is no singular federal policy regarding renewable 
energy, much of the policy innovation in this context has occurred at the 
state and local level.  Indeed, many praise the institutional ability of state 
and local governments to innovate, given the slow pace of development 
of federal climate change policies.1  Most states, for example, have adopted 
renewable energy standards, requiring a defined amount of electricity 
generated or sold to come from renewable sources, such as solar panels, 
wind turbines, biomass, geothermal, or tidal power.2  Many states also 
have adopted fairly aggressive subsidies and incentives for clean energy 
projects, including tax breaks3 and other non-tax incentives.4 
One particularly promising state approach to encouraging renewable 
power is the so-called feed-in tariff.  Common in several European 
countries, the feed-in tariff is also sometimes called a “standard offer 
contract,” an “advanced renewable tariff” or a “renewable energy payment.”  
What all of these approaches share is a regulatory requirement that the 
incumbent utility purchase some or all of the power generated by a 
renewable technology at a set price per kilowatt-hour (“kWh”).  The 
prices frequently vary depending on the location and kind of technology 
used, and sometimes the prices will change over time based on the 
duration of the tariff or the amount of power purchased.  However, 
 1. See Garrick B. Pursley & Hannah J. Wiseman, Local Energy, 60 EMORY L.J. 
877 (2011); David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Reorienting State Climate Change 
Policies to Induce Technological Change, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 835, 866–69 (2008). 
 2. Lincoln L. Davies, Power Forward: The Argument for a National RPS, 42 
CONN. L. REV. 1339, 1370–75, 1382–84 (2010); see Joshua P. Fershee, Renewable 
Mandates and Goals, in THE LAW OF CLEAN ENERGY 77, 80 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 
2011) (noting that 30 states and the District of Columbia have adopted renewable portfolio 
standards). 
 3. See Roberta F. Mann & E. Margaret Rowe, Taxation, in THE LAW OF CLEAN 
ENERGY 145–46 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2011) (describing federal, state, and local tax 
incentives for renewable energy projects). 
 4. See John A. Herrick, Government Nontax Incentives for Clean Energy, in THE 
LAW OF CLEAN ENERGY 169 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2011) (describing carbon credits 
and other state incentive programs). 
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typically the price provided by a feed-in tariff exceeds the price of 
generating electricity using a fossil fuel, such as natural gas or coal, as 
well as the general price for power available in the wholesale market.5 
Several state and local governments have implemented feed-in tariffs 
to encourage investment in renewable power by guaranteeing a price for 
its sale.  The scope and applicability of these tariff programs vary, as 
does the pricing.  Most of the programs limit participation to a certain 
number of projects or to a certain size of the total generation load.  
While the list below is not intended to be exhaustive, a few illustrations 
can give a flavor of how state and local governments are approaching 
this innovative instrument as a tool to enhance investment in clean 
energy: 
California has approved a number of utility proposed feed-in tariffs.  
Unlike other California incentives, which give customers short-term, up-
front incentives to install solar, wind, and biogas, feed-in tariffs give 
customers a long-term contract at a fixed price.  California made feed-in 
tariffs available for facilities that generate 1.5 megawatts (“MW”) or 
less, for a statewide total of up to 480 MW of renewable generating 
capacity.  Rates are set for ten, fifteen, twenty, and twenty-five year 
contracts based on a “market price referent,” which is the “predicted 
annual average cost of production for a combined-cycle natural gas fired 
base load proxy plant,” along with a time-of-day adjustment.6  For larger 
scale projects, up to 20 MW, California has considered a different 
pricing mechanism based on a renewable auction mechanism, which 
applies to a statewide total of up to 1,000 MW of procured power.7 
Hawaii adopted a feed-in tariff in 2009 and set prices in 2010.  Hawaii 
set tiered rates for different types of renewable sources depending on the 
project size.  For example, photovoltaic solar projects that are less than 
or equal to 20 kilowatts (“kW”) in size qualify for a rate of $.218 per 
kWh, while photovoltaic projects that are greater than 20 kW but less 
than or equal to 500 kW qualify for a price of $.189 per kWh.  On-shore 
wind projects less than 20 kW qualifies for a rate of $.161 per kWh and 
those greater than 20 kW but less than or equal to 500 kW qualifies for a 
price of $.138 per kWh.  The largest qualifying facilities are 5 MW and 
 5. Compare infra note 39 (noting 2010 wholesale prices) with infra notes 6–11 
and accompanying text (summarizing prices in various feed-in tariff programs). 
 6. See Feed-in Tariff Price, CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N (Nov. 17, 2010), http:// 
www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/energy/Renewables/Feed-in+Tariff+Price.htm. 
 7.  See Renewable Auction Mechanism, CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N (Aug. 29, 2011), 
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/energy/Renewables/hot/Renewable+Auction+Mechanism.
htm; see also Mike Hall, Op-Ed., Cali Gets It Right: Not Your Father’s Feed-in Tariff, 
PUB. UTILS. FORTNIGHTLY, July 2011, at 8. 
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the baseline feed-in tariff rate where technology prices are not specified 
is $.138 kWh.8 
Vermont adopted a statewide feed-in tariff requirement in 2009.  The 
legislation mandated the development of feed-in tariff rates for biomass, 
landfill methane, farm methane, hydroelectric, solar photovoltaic, and 
wind, with recalculation every two years.  Based on the first phase of 
rates set under the legislation, twenty-five year contracts are issued 
for solar at $.24 per kWh.  Most other resources are given twenty year 
contracts, with small wind at $.2083 per kWh and large wind at $.1125 
per kWh.  Landfill gas is priced at $.0869 per kWh on a fifteen year 
contract.  No single technology can occupy more than 25% of the 
application queue.  Participation in the tariff is limited to projects up to 
2.2 MW in size, and total statewide participation in the project is limited 
to 50 MW.9 
Gainesville, Florida was the first municipal government in the U.S. to 
adopt a feed-in tariff requirement.  The tariff is limited to solar 
photovoltaics and bases its price on the cost of renewable energy alone, 
rather than some other pricing referent.  Much like European feed-in 
tariffs, which use a fixed rate targeted at certain technologies, the program 
guarantees participants a rate of $.32 per kWh of electricity produced 
over twenty years.10  Gainesville set a total installation cap of 4 MW per 
year, and it quickly met these targets.11 
Although the details of these various feed-in tariff programs differ, 
their common goal is to provide a certain price for the sale of renewable 
power.  Such predictability is essential to the long-term contracts that are 
typically used to finance renewable energy investments, especially given 
the precarious financing environment for high capital new technologies.  
To help secure financing, investors and developers of renewable power 
 8. See Hawaii Feed-in Tariff, DATABASE OF STATE INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES 
& EFFICIENCY (Oct. 7, 2011), http://www.dsireusa.org/incentives/incentive.cfm? Incentive 
_Code=HI29F&re=1&ee=1. 
 9. See Dave Lamont, U.S. Feed-in Tariff Example: Vermont, THE REGULATORY 
ASSISTANCE PROJECT (June 22, 2011), available at http://www.raponline.org/docs/RAP_ 
Lamont_Feed-inTariffsVT_ADB_2011_06_22.pdf 
 10. See Gainesville Solar Feed-in Tariff a Done Deal, RENEWABLEENERGY 
WORLD.COM (Feb. 9, 2009), http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2009/ 
02/gainesville-solar-feed-in-tariff-a-done-deal. 
 11. See Lessons from the Gainesville Feed-in Tariff Program, APOLLO ALLIANCE: 
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projects depend on power purchase agreements.12  The feed-in tariff 
gives the renewable project developer an off-the-shelf contract in the 
form of a tariff.  An additional advantage to requiring the incumbent 
utility to purchase this power is that the utility can typically spread the 
costs associated with the renewable facility among all of the customers it 
serves.  In this sense, the costs of renewable facilities financed through 
feed-in tariffs are more likely to be borne by customers of the utility 
whose system is using that source of electricity, rather than by the general 
tax base or a broader population, as occurs with other clean energy 
subsidies. 
Given that a utility subject to a feed-in tariff requirement must pay the 
tariff rate for the power it purchases from participating projects, the price 
retail customers pay for electricity will likely increase.  For example, 
almost all the feed-in tariff prices listed above exceed the levelized cost 
of production for natural gas, which is the cheapest alternative for 
marginal production of electricity in most areas of the U.S.13  Yet most 
utilities rely heavily on fossil fuels and more pervasive deployment of 
renewable facilities can allow the utility to diversify its power generation 
portfolio, which will create benefits for that utility’s customers and for 
others who operate with that utility as part of a larger electric power 
system.  Some studies indicate that price increases associated with feed-
in tariffs are, at some level, offset.  Looked at on a system or larger 
network basis, large amounts of renewable power can have positive 
impacts on the operation of energy markets due to the merit-order effect, 
or the ability to allow operators of utility systems greater flexibility and 
network benefits in meeting load and peak demand.14 
II. FERC’S PREEMPTION OF FEED-IN TARIFFS 
Federal agencies have frequently preempted state innovations in the 
wholesale pricing of electricity in order to advance the consumer 
 12. For a survey of some of these financing challenges in the wake of the global 
economic downturn, see Christopher Dann, Sharez Ahmed & Owen Ward, Renewables 
at a Crossroads: Investment Opportunities in an Evolving Environment, PUB. UTILS. 
FORTNIGHTLY, June 2011, at 43. 
 13. See Steven Ferrey, Sale of Electricity, in THE LAW OF CLEAN ENERGY 217, 233 
(Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2011)  (power purchase agreements are the “essential legal 
documents[s] for all power projects not owned by the retail provider of power, as they 
link operation to a revenue stream for the power product produced and sold”). 
 14. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, the 2009 average 
level cost of production from natural gas in a combined cycle generation facility is in the 
range of $.06–.07 per kilowatt-hour (“kwh”).  See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL 
ENERGY OUTLOOK 2011 (Dec. 2010). 
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protection goals of federal law.15  The Federal Power Act of 1935 
(FPA”) precludes utilities under FERC’s jurisdiction from charging 
wholesale rates that are not “just and reasonable” or that are “unduly 
discriminatory.”16  The very purpose of the FPA was to respond, in part, 
to the glaring inadequacies of state regulation in regulating the pricing of 
electric power in interstate markets17 by giving the Federal Power 
Commission (FERC’s predecessor) the authority to set rates for 
transactions that have an impact beyond a single state’s borders.18 
Although the FPA is the primary statute that established federal price 
regulation of electric power, it is not the only basis for FERC approving 
utility rates.  In the Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act of 1978 
(“PURPA”),19 Congress established a program to encourage competition, 
efficiency, and conservation in power generation.  This program includes a 
series of interconnection and price benefits for non-utility developers of 
certain generation projects, including a program that exempts certain 
renewable facilities from regulation under the FPA and requires incumbent 
utilities to buy back surplus power at so-called FERC-approved “avoided 
cost” rates.  PURPA explicitly states that no FERC rule requiring a utility to 
purchase power pursuant to such a program “shall provide for a rate that 
exceeds the incremental cost to the electric utility of alternative electric 
energy.”20 
Some see these statutes as presenting a legal obstacle to states 
establishing their own feed-in tariffs without some prior approval from 
FERC.  One commentator draws a contrast between the constitutional 
fate of feed-in tariffs in the U.S. and Europe: 
  
 15. Jim Rossi, Lowering the Filed Tariff Shield: Judicial Enforcement for 
a Deregulatory Era, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1591, 1642–44 (2003) (discussing how the “filed 
rate doctrine” can preempt state regulation where the terms of a tariff are approved by FERC). 
 16. 16 U.S.C. § 824d (2006). 
 17. See Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Rhode Island v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 
U.S. 83, 90 (1927) (limiting the ability of a state to regulate sales to out-of-state customers 
under the Commerce Clause, but acknowledging this could leave interstate sales unregulated 
at some harm to in-state consumers). 
 18.  The FPA, passed in part to address the so-called “Attleboro gap,” gave the 
Federal Power Commission (FERC’s predecessor agency) the power to regulate the “sale 
of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce.”  16 U.S.C. § 824(b) (2006). 
 19. 16 U.S.C. § 2601, Pub. L. No. 95-617 (1978). 
 20. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (2006). 
 249 
 
ROSSI - FINAL NO EDITS TO ACCEPT FROM AUTHOR (DO NOT DELETE) 1/15/2016  2:02 PM 
 
Grafting onto American constitutional law a mandatory FiT [(feed-in tariff)] for 
renewable power, at above the typical wholesale market cost of all power or 
above a purchasing utility’s avoided cost of alternative equivalent power resources, 
confronts existing legal precedent and provisions of the FPA.  This renders the 
European option of wholesale FiT legally barred from state mandate under 
American’s legal system.21 
A study by the National Renewable Energy Laboratory observes that 
only very limited paths are available for feed-in tariffs.22  That study 
concludes that “[d]etailed discussions involving FERC, renewable 
producers, utility buyers, and possibly Congress will be necessary to 
create a legal context in which states can enact or promulgate feed-in 
tariffs . . . .”23 
In 2010, FERC issued two decisions that endorse a strong preemption 
position regarding the prices in feed-in tariffs, in response to a request 
for a declaratory order on the legal validity of a California Public 
Utilities Commission feed-in tariff proposal.  A Summer 2010 order 
endorsed preemption of California’s feed-in tariff policy under PURPA.  
According to FERC, the state was not precluded from adopting a feed-in 
tariff, but the agency concluded that any feed-in tariff must comply with 
PURPA’s avoided cost standard.24  Moreover, FERC determined that 
PURPA’s avoided cost rates would serve as a cap on any state feed-in 
tariff prices, and that to the extent a facility was not a facility with a 
permit under PURPA, wholesale rates determined under the FPA would 
serve as a ceiling on feed-in tariff rates.25  In Fall 2010, FERC issued an 
order on rehearing clarifying its preemption position and rejecting 
California’s argument that there was no mandate under its rates requiring 
FERC approval of feed-in tariff buyback rates.26 
The effect of these decisions is to bring feed-in tariff renewable 
pricing by states, as well as by municipal governments,27 under the 
 21. Steven Ferrey, Chad Laurent & Cameron Ferrey, FIT in the USA:  Constitutional 
Questions About State-Mandated Renewable Tariffs, PUB. UTILS. FORTNIGHTLY, 
June 2010, at 60, 66. 
 22. Scott Hempling, Carolyn Elefant, Karlynn Cory & Kevin Porter, Renewable 
Energy Prices in State-Level Feed-in Tariffs: Federal Law Constraints and Possible 
Solutions, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB. v (Jan. 2010), available at http://www.nrel. 
gov/analysis/pdfs/47408.pdf. 
 23. Id. 
 24. California Public Utilities Commission, 132 FERC ¶ 61,047, at para. 67 (July 
15, 2010) (Order on Petitions for Declaratory Order). 
 25. Id. at para. 69. 
 26. See, e.g., California Public Utilities Commission, 133 FERC ¶ 61,059, at paras. 
25–30 (October 21, 2010) (Order Granting Clarification and Dismissing Rehearing). 
 27. Although, as discussed below, municipal governments are exempt from wholesale 
price regulation under the FPA, PURPA creates a category called a “nonregulated utility” 
(which include a state-owned, municipal-owned, or cooperatively owned entity), subjecting 
this to PURPA, purchase and avoided cost mandate.  16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(f)(2) (2011). 
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regulation of FERC, which will not allow any prices set by sub-national 
regulators to exceed avoided cost rates.  FERC may be flexible in the 
way it decides to regulate feed-in tariff terms.  In fact, each state can 
advance its own avoided cost methodology, consistent with FERC’s rules, 
and FERC’s order on rehearing clarified that states have “a wide degree 
of latitude” with their methodology for setting avoided costs under PURPA.28  
For example, FERC clarified that states can calculate multiple-tiered 
avoided cost rates for different classes of power generators and also take 
into account differences in transmission costs for different kinds of 
generation.29  States thus still have some options in adopting feed-in 
tariffs, even under FERC’s orders.  However, the orders are unequivocal 
in concluding that feed-in tariff pricing terms are not purely a matter of 
state law but are subject to approval by FERC and a price ceiling 
under PURPA.  Given that FERC has not established any general criteria or 
rebuttable presumptions for renewable tariffs terms,30 feed-in tariff 
programs survive the scrutiny of FERC on a case-by-case basis prior to 
implementation if they comply with the mandate of FERC’s orders. 
In support of its approach, FERC quoted a series of agency orders 
from the 1990s that found PURPA’s avoided cost rates to be a ceiling on 
any state rate for PURPA licensed facilities, including renewable projects.31  
This approach echoes, and implicitly adopts, dictum from the Ninth 
Circuit that PURPA’s avoided cost rates are the “statutory ceiling” 
(presumably based in the terms “that exceeds” in Section 210 of PURPA) a 
utility can be forced to pay when required to buy back power under 
PURPA.32  In this case, the court concluded that a previous California 
avoided cost program “is preempted by PURPA insofar as it authorized 
the [u]tilities to determine that a [qualifying facility] is not in 
compliance with [FERC’s] operating and efficiency standards and to 
impose a reduced avoided cost rate on that [qualifying facility].”33  
 28. 133 FERC ¶ 61,059, at para. 7. 
 29. Id. paras. 12, 14–16. 
 30. This approach was urged by the National Renewable Energy Laboratory.  See 
Hempling, Elefant, Cory & Porter, supra note 22, at viii. 
 31. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 70 FERC ¶ 61,215 (1995), reconsideration denied, 
71 FERC ¶ 61,269 (1995) (quoted in order denying hearing); see also Midwest Power 
Sys., Inc., 78 FERC ¶ 61,067 (1997); Conn. Power & Light Co., 70 FERC ¶ 61,012 
(1995), reconsideration denied, 71 FERC ¶ 61,035 (1995). 
 32. See Independent Energy Producer Ass’n v. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 36 F.3d 
848, 852–53 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 33. Id. at 858. 
 251 
 
ROSSI - FINAL NO EDITS TO ACCEPT FROM AUTHOR (DO NOT DELETE) 1/15/2016  2:02 PM 
 
While Ninth Circuit dictum did claim PURPA as a statutory ceiling, 
notably in applying PURPA to the fact before the court, it only treated 
PURPA as a floor—preempting California’s efforts to undermine basic 
federal operational and efficiency criteria for new non-utility projects—
not as a ceiling.  It thus seems a bit of a stretch to conclude that FERC’s 
ceiling preemption approach was mandated by PURPA or any appellate 
court. 
A ceiling approach to preemption of state feed-in tariffs under PURPA 
is also not necessary from a practical perspective.  A feed-in tariff is 
different from other kinds of projects that are issued permits by FERC to 
operate under PURPA.  Feed-in tariffs are established under state law, 
and only attach if a project meets criteria set by the state.  A renewable 
project does not need to obtain a PURPA permit from FERC, which 
would entitle it to avoided cost rates, in order to qualify for a state feed-
in tariff rate.  FERC’s feed-in tariff decisions thus fail to distinguish how 
a state feed-in tariff operates independent of—and may even supplement 
—a request for the “avoided cost” benefit under PURPA.  By treating 
the avoided cost rate as a ceiling, FERC ignored completely how the 
benefits that flow to renewable project developers depend on what the 
project developer asks for, and whether he selects to seek advantages for 
its project under state or federal law.  Although set by states (subject to 
FERC approval), PURPA avoided cost rates only attach to projects that 
are licensed by FERC as “qualifying facilities.”  This makes PURPA an 
opt-in program, and qualification for the benefits of a feed-in tariff, 
including rates and interconnection for a renewable project, does not 
change or modify any of the benefits specified under federal law. 
In addition to failing to recognize the opt-in nature of PURPA, 
FERC’s approach to construing the statutory purposes behind PURPA in 
its feed-in tariff orders does not provide non-utility projects the same 
regulatory treatment as utility sponsored projects.  It is well recognized 
that PURPA was designed to encourage not only the goal of consumer 
protection, but also goals of conservation, fuel diversity, and technological 
innovation.  In order to encourage new entrants into the industry, 
Congress incorporated into PURPA’s scheme a principle of purchaser 
indifference—that FERC’s implementation of the statute should leave 
utilities indifferent between buying power from a non-utility project, 
including renewable projects, or the utility generating power itself.34  
 34. The U.S. Supreme Court endorsed this principle in FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 
742, 750–51 (1982) (noting Congress’s objective in enacting PURPA was to encourage 
the development of cogeneration and small power production—including renewable facilities 




ROSSI - FINAL NO EDITS TO ACCEPT FROM AUTHOR (DO NOT DELETE) 1/15/2016  2:02 PM 
[VOL. 3:  243, 2011–12]  Clean Energy 
  SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE & ENERGY LAW 
Yet FERC’s reading of PURPA as a ceiling elevates consumer 
protection (and perhaps limited operational efficiency goals) over this 
purchaser indifference principle.  The ironic effect is to severely limit 
a state’s direct payments to purchases from non-utility developers of 
renewable projects, while states can continue to allow a utility to raise 
retail rates without regard to the avoided cost ceiling to subsidize that 
utility’s own renewable projects. 
FERC’s approach to interpreting PURPA will impact state feed-in 
tariffs for smaller scale projects, given that large-scale (more than 20 
MW) projects routinely are exempted from or exceed PURPA’s size 
requirements.35  But, given FERC’s approach, any potential feed-in tariff 
pricing program for larger scale projects is also in serious peril.  For 
these larger projects, the FPA’s mandate that wholesale rates be set in a 
“just and reasonable” and not “unduly discriminatory” manner will 
undoubtedly preempt feed-in tariffs if FERC follows a similar approach 
to preemption.36  The preemption analysis of these decisions consistently 
regards the wholesale price, whether approved by FERC or set by the 
market under FERC’s competition policies, to serve as a ceiling on any 
state-set feed-in tariff rate. 
The effect of such an approach is to entirely eviscerate state efforts to 
adopt non-market-based feed-in tariffs for larger scale renewable 
projects.  According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration in 
2010, average wholesale electric power prices ranged from $.036 per 
kWh in the Northwest to $.066 per kWh in New York, with an average 
California wholesale price of .047 per kWh.37  All of these averages are 
 35. Under 2005 amendments to PURPA, FERC has allowed utilities to seek exemption 
from PURPA buyback obligations for qualifying facilities greater than 20 MW.  See 16 
U.S.C. § 824a-3(m)(1) (2005); see also 18 C.F.R. § 292.309 (2007) (FERC regulations 
implementing changes).  FERC has created rebuttable presumptions to implement this 
exception and it appears that the exemption, while not guaranteed, has been granted fairly 
regularly.  See Hempling, Elefant, Cory & Porter, supra note 22, at 12. 
 36. The FPA’s rate mandate for utilities is more limited in its application than 
PURPA’s.  The FPA excludes publicly owned municipal utilities, public power districts, 
and irrigation districts, as well as cooperatively owned utilities from FERC’s jurisdiction.  See 
Federal Power Act § 201, 16 U.S.C. § 824(f) (1935).  FERC also has no jurisdiction over 
the wholesale market in Hawaii and Alaska, because these states do not physically 
participate in interstate markets in electricity given their lack of contiguity with the other 
48 states.  FERC also has no jurisdiction over wholesale electric trades in much of Texas, 
which is regulated by the Electricity Reliability Council of Texas. 
 37. See Average Wholesale Electric Power Prices Rose in 2010, U.S. ENERGY INFO. 
ADMIN. (Mar. 4, 2011), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=370. 
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below the feed-in tariffs rates that states have set for that period.38  Thus, 
with the exception of Hawaii (which is simply not subject to FERC 
jurisdiction under the FPA39), if extended to larger-scale projects, the 
state feed-in tariff fixed rates described above would likely be invalid.  
California’s market price referent for larger scale projects,40 which is 
based on the combined-cycled natural gas generation plant costs, could 
remain in operation so long as the market price does not exceed 
wholesale prices.  This means that these projects will receive no tangible 
purchase subsidy at all, except to the extent that California builds into its 
approval decisions for new projects some neutral preference for renewable 
facilities (i.e., a preference that does not favor non-utility projects).  
Ironically, under FERC’s approach, California could authorize its own 
utilities to increase their retail rates to subsidize their own large-scale 
renewable generation projects—including contracting with third-party 
developers to build renewable facilities—but price ceiling preemption 
precludes California from requiring a utility to provide a similar direct 
payment to non-utility renewable projects. 
III. CEILING PREEMPTION AND CLEAN ENERGY POLICIES 
In addressing the clean energy innovation of state and local feed-in 
tariffs, FERC has treated both PURPA and the FPA as containing price 
ceilings which potentially preempt the ability of sub-national regulators 
to set prices to encourage investment in clean energy.  The origins of this 
ceiling preemption approach date to the pre-New Deal “filed rate 
doctrine,” which was originally designed to protect interstate railroad 
consumers against monopolistic price discrimination.41  Under the filed 
rate doctrine, since the FPA was adopted during the New Deal, FERC’s 
traditional cost-based rate setting has been recognized by courts as 
preempting state regulators from setting prices that depart from a FERC-
approved rate.42  More recently, courts have also recognized that FERC’s 
policy of favoring competitive wholesale markets can also preempt state 
 38. See supra Part I. 
 39. See supra text accompanying note 36. 
 40. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 41. Rossi, supra note 15, at 1598–1602. 
 42. See Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 953 (1986) 
(noting “Congress’ desire to give FERC plenary authority over interstate wholesale rates, 
and to ensure that the States do not interfere with this authority”).  Interestingly, many 
circuit courts and FERC have recognized an exception to this doctrine that would allow a 
state to deny a utility the opportunity to recover costs incurred as the result of buying power at 
the FERC-established wholesale rate if the specific purchase, apart from the rate itself, is 
deemed imprudent by state regulators.  See Rossi, supra note 15, at 1607. 
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pricing initiatives.43  With the evolution of wholesale markets in electric 
power in the 1990s, FERC also began to consistently apply ceiling 
preemption to PURPA avoided costs,44 for the purposes of advancing 
consumer protection goals.  This approach has also emphasized efficiency 
to a degree, but only in the narrow sense of avoiding unfair advantages 
to new entrants that might harm consumers.45  As I argue, recognition of 
the diverse values endorsed in modern energy statutes should lead to 
reassessment of this approach; in some instances, such as clean energy 
policy innovations by sub-national governments, a ceiling approach 
undermines other statutory goals and treating federal law as a preemption 
floor will better advance the goals of federal law. 
A.  Polyphonic Values and the Preemption Floor of Energy Law 
FERC’s ceiling preemption approach to feed-in tariffs highlights a 
longstanding debate surrounding the goals of PURPA.  While consumer 
protection and the operational efficiency of new plants are relevant 
PURPA goals, the statute is widely understood to endorse a much 
broader set of values.  Writing more than 15 years ago against the 
backdrop of a rise in FERC market-set wholesale prices, Judge Richard 
Cudahy warned courts and FERC against emphasizing any singular goal 
in PURPA’s implementation, noting that “both fuel diversity and energy 
conservation might be completely ignored if the only emphasis in 
evaluating generation is on current market price.”46  He lamented how 
recent agency orders, including some of the main agency precedents 
relied on by FERC in its feed-in tariffs decisions,47 emphasize competition 
 43. See Duke Energy Trading & Marketing v. Davis, 267 F.3d 1042, 1058–59 (9th 
Cir. 2001) (finding wholesale market set rates approved by FERC preempt the California 
Governor’s effort to protect consumers against strategic manipulation of its deregulated 
power market).  See also Norwood v. New Eng. Power Co., 202 F.3d 408, 416 (1st Cir. 
2000) (treating market base-based rates approved by FERC under the filed rate doctrine) 
 44. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (discussing earlier FERC orders finding 
ceiling preemption). 
 45. Since PURPA is not limited to renewable facilities but also includes cogeneration, 
one of the problems with PURPA was a perception that FERC had favored non-utility 
cogeneration over utility-sponsored projects, and that PURPA had become a reverse 
subsidy for sometimes inefficient projects.  This concern led to reform of PURPA in 2005 to 
exempt many of these larger cogeneration projects from avoided cost rates.  See supra 
note 35 (describing PURPA’s exemption process for projects exceeding 20 mw). 
 46. Richard D. Cudahy, PURPA: The Intersection of Competition and Regulatory 
Policy, 16 ENERGY L.J. 419, 421 (1995). 
 47. See supra note 46 (referencing Southern California Edison orders). 
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and deregulated markets, while ignoring “the environment, diversity of 
generation, energy self-sufficiency and the like.”48 
Moreover, FERC’s ceiling price preemption approach ignores PURPA’s 
cooperative federalism origins.  In contradiction to FERC’s own feed-in 
tariffs orders, FERC’s rules implementing Section 210 of PURPA explicitly 
envision avoided cost rates as a floor for state innovation, not a price 
ceiling: 
This Commission has set the rate for purchases at a level which it 
believes appropriate to encourage cogeneration and small power production, as 
required by section 210 of PURPA.  While the rules prescribed under section 
210 of PURPA are subject to the statutory parameters, the States are free, under their 
own authority, to enact laws or regulations providing for rates which would 
result in even greater encouragement of these technologies.  However, State laws or 
regulations which would provide rates lower than the federal standards would 
fail to provide the requisite encouragement of these technologies, and must yield 
to federal law.49 
This sort of cooperative federalism approach is consistent with what 
Congress envisioned in PURPA, and was endorsed by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in a case that also recognized that PURPA endorses the general 
principle of making an incumbent utility indifferent between making 
purchases from non-utility firms and generating power itself.50  FERC’s 
adoption of a ceiling approach regarding feed-in tariffs elevates consumer 
protection and efficiency in importance, but the approach inevitably 
hobbles sub-national governments from pursuing other conservation and 
fuel diversity goals that overlap with PURPA, contrary to both the statute’s 
goals and the agency’s rules implementing PURPA avoided cost rates. 
PURPA is not the only energy statute that embraces a diverse range of 
values.  The FPA’s “just and reasonable” requirement historically 
has been interpreted in a narrow manner to focus on consumer protection 
goals under the traditional regulatory contract.51  In recent years, however, it 
has become apparent that FERC’s regulation of electric power is no 
longer solely concerned with protecting consumers—simply put, the 
regulatory contract has expanded beyond incumbent utilities and 
their customers.52  FERC itself recognized this in the 1990s with its 
introduction of wholesale competition to the industry,53 which allowed 
 48. See supra note 46, at 436 (referencing Southern California Edison orders). 
 49. 45 Fed. Reg. 12,214, 12,221 (Feb. 25, 1980). 
 50. See supra text accompanying note 35. 
 51. See Rossi, supra note 16, at 1598-1603. 
 52. An argument developed further in JIM ROSSI, REGULATORY BARGAINING AND 
PUBLIC LAW (2005). 
 53. Wholesale competition and regulation of the wholesale market became an 
official FERC policy in 1996 when the agency issued its landmark Order No. 888.  See 
Landmark Orders: Order No. 888, FERC, http://www.ferc.gov/legal/maj-ord-reg/land-
docs/order888.asp (last updated June 28, 2010). 
256 
 
ROSSI - FINAL NO EDITS TO ACCEPT FROM AUTHOR (DO NOT DELETE) 1/15/2016  2:02 PM 
[VOL. 3:  243, 2011–12]  Clean Energy 
  SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE & ENERGY LAW 
new entrants in the industry to proliferate.  At the state level, regulators 
apply similar “just and reasonable” rate language under their own statutes in 
setting retail rates.  Over time, state regulators have endorsed the 
incorporation of broader values into the regulatory contract’s “just and 
reasonable” standard, including environmental protection, efficiency, 
and conservation.54  In the past 40 years, the FPA has also been amended 
on multiple occasions to address issues including energy security and 
conservation, and Congress has passed numerous generic statutes such 
as the National Environmental Policy Act55 as well as more particular 
statutes such as PURPA that bring a broader range of goals into play.56  
With the addition of new statutes reflecting new values, the FPA’s “just 
and reasonable” mandate has evolved beyond the narrow New Deal 
notion that regulators are solely concerned with protecting the customers 
of a utility from monopolistic abuses. 
As a method of statutory interpretation, recognizing a diversity of 
statutory values, especially in contexts where institutional authority 
overlaps, is more consistent with preemption floors than ceilings, except 
in instances where there is a clear obstacle or where Congress has clearly 
expressed a preference to the contrary.  If a statute only endorses goal X, 
any decision about an approach to preemption will focus on which 
institutional actors will best advance that specific goal.  However, if a 
statute recognizes a range of policies—X, Y, and Z—and an agency or 
court applies a preemption ceiling for a singular policy—X—that 
singular goal will trump or constrain the pursuit of any other goals, 
 54. Fundamental shifts have occurred in the “utility consensus” behind price 
regulation at the state level, increasingly recognizing environmental and conservational 
values as well as traditional consumer protection goals in the implementation of state 
law, even where that law was not updated by the legislature.  See RICHARD F. HIRSH, 
POWER LOSS: THE ORIGINS OF DEREGULATION AND RESTRUCTURING IN THE AMERICAN 
ELECTRIC UTILITY SYSTEM 268 (1999). 
 55. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347 (2006). 
 56. PURPA is certainly not the only other statute of relevance to FERC in 
regulating wholesale electricity prices.  Apart from procedural statutes, such as NEPA, 
other energy statutes with which the agency must comply (many of which have been 
incorporated into provisions of the FPA through amendments and new sections) include: 
Electric Consumers Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-495, 100 Stat. 1243 
(amending various provisions of the FPA); Energy Independence and Security Act of 
2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, 121 Stat. 1492 (amending various provisions of the FPA); 
Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (amending and adding 
provisions of the FPA); Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 
(amending and adding various provisions to the FPA); Power Plant and Industrial Fuel 
Use Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 8301–8483 (2006). 
 257 
 
ROSSI - FINAL NO EDITS TO ACCEPT FROM AUTHOR (DO NOT DELETE) 1/15/2016  2:02 PM 
 
limiting the ability of regulators to balance multiple goals in the pursuit of 
the statute’s overall purposes.  Thus, as a general matter, where a statute 
endorses a range of goals, without clearly favoring one, preemption 
ceilings are generally not an effective means of advancing the statute’s 
values since they limit the ability of regulators to balance goals in 
implementing the statute.57 
The role of preemption floors is well explored in the context of 
environmental statutes, where state regulators for purposes of meeting 
environmental protection and other goals can exceed federal standards.  
William Buzbee has explored the significance of preemption floors in 
contexts where Congress has manifested a preference for regulatory 
overlap and interaction.  In addressing the implications of the choice of 
floors versus ceilings, his work highlights the advantages of floors over 
ceilings in encouraging innovation, especially in contexts where regulators 
face a diversity of goals and volatility.58  Consistent with the approach of 
most courts interpreting environmental statutes, his work carefully 
assesses institutional incentives and the importance of preemption floors 
to environmental statutes such as the Clean Air Act and Clean Water 
Act.59  Closer to the realm of energy law, and clean energy in particular, 
Alexandra Klass has questioned the federal ceiling preemption approach 
some courts have extended to appliance efficiency standards set by the 
U.S. Department of Energy (“DOE”).60  She concludes that “while there 
may be good reasons to create a single, federal standard in situations 
where there are concerns regarding economic protectionism, product 
innovation, conflicting standards or policy disputes among the states, 
those concerns do not appear to be present in the area of appliance 
efficiency.”61  Elevating uniformity as a singular goal in such a context 
 57. Although she argues against all agency preemption, including floor preemption, 
Nina Mendelson similarly emphasizes how multiple goal statutes require agencies to balance 
multiple goals rather than prioritize a single goal and constrain the pursuit of other values.  
See Nina A. Mendelson, A Presumption Against Agency Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 
695, 713 (2008) (observing that conflict preemption is especially problematic for multiple 
goal statutes because “[a]n agency can nearly always identify some statutory goal . . . 
with which the state law will conflict.”). 
 58. See William W. Buzbee, Federal Floors, Ceilings and the Benefits of Federalism’s 
Institutional Diversity, in PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF 
FEDERALISM’S CORE QUESTION 98 (William W. Buzbee ed., 2009). 
 59. William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/ 
Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547 (2007); William W. Buzbee, Interaction’s 
Promise: Preemption Policy Shifts, Risk Regulation, and Experimentalism Lessons, 57 
EMORY L.J. 145 (2007). 
 60. Alexandra B. Klass, State Standards for Nationwide Products Revisited: Federalism, 
Green Building Codes, and Appliance Efficiency Standards, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 335 
(2010). 
 61. Id. at 367. 
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would trivialize other state objectives and disable institutional actors 
from pursuing them. 
To the extent federal energy laws are similarly focused on 
simultaneously balancing multiple values, such as conservation and fuel 
diversity, FERC and courts have much to gain from reconsidering the 
traditional approach to treating federal law as a ceiling in setting prices.  
Recognizing the balance of values in federal statutes as setting a floor 
can help federal regulators carve out a space to encourage sub-national 
innovation in clean energy policy.  Such an approach is particularly 
compelling in the context of a statute such as PURPA, where Congress 
clearly had a cooperative federalism model in mind.  Yet even in the 
context of the FPA, where the statute is informed by other statutes and 
guides decisions in a context where institutional authority is overlapping, 
a floor approach to preemption helps us to imagine federal energy law’s 
ability to promote clean energy in new ways. 
Such an approach does not require courts and regulators to reject 
federal preemption entirely.  Preemption can have a role where a state’s 
pursuit of a goal presents an obstacle to the pursuit of a clearly identified 
federal goal, or where there are needs for federal regulation to manage 
economic protectionism or conflicting state standards.  Where the goals 
of federal and sub-national policies align, treating federal standards as a 
floor allows sub-national governments to do more to assist federal 
regulators in pursuing their goals.  If a state conservation program produces 
benefits for in-state consumers or producers by externalizing the costs to 
the citizens of other states, it can become a legitimate concern for federal 
regulators in setting prices if those benefits are inconsistent with federal 
goals.  Preemption may be appropriate in such circumstances.  However, 
where a state conservation program produces benefits and costs for that 
state’s customers only, and does not have any tangible effect on out-of-
state consumers or producers or has an effect that is consistent with 
federal goals, there is no concern about protectionism or conflicting state 
standards, and ceiling preemption is counterproductive. 
B.  Application of Preemption Floors to Transmission                                 
Siting and Demand Response 
Despite FERC’s narrow definition of PURPA’s goals and its ceiling 
approach to preemption in addressing feed-in tariffs, the agency in other 
clean energy contexts has begun to recognize how the multiplicity of 
goals behind energy statutes favors preemption floors rather than 
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ceilings.  Two recent examples—transmission line siting and cost 
allocation, and demand response policies—highlight how endorsing a 
broader understanding of the goals of federal statutes allows federal law 
to serve as a floor for innovation in clean energy policies, even where a 
cooperative federalism statute such as PURPA is not at issue. 
First, consider the construction and location of high voltage 
transmission lines—one of the most significant barriers renewable 
energy projects in the U.S. face today given that so many renewable 
energy resources are located in rather remote geographic areas.  One of 
the major impediments to the financing and location of transmission 
lines is the state regulatory process, which has tended to favor in-state 
interests over broader regional and national interests in building a new or 
expanding an existing line.62  According to FERC Chairman Jon 
Wellinghoff, “We need a National policy commitment to develop the 
extra-high voltage (EHV) transmission infrastructure to bring renewable 
energy from remote areas where it is produced most efficiently into our 
large metropolitan areas where most of this Nation’s power is consumed.”63 
For many years, FERC lacked any ability to site transmission lines 
over the objections of recalcitrant states, but Congress in 2005 amended 
the FPA to give FERC “backstop” authority to override state regulators 
who refuse to site lines that meet certain criteria in certain geographic 
areas designated as National Interest Electric Transmission Corridors by 
the DOE.64  To put it lightly, the three appellate courts that have reviewed 
federal agency decisions under these statutory amendments have not looked 
kindly on federal regulators’ implementation of these amendments, 
consistently reversing FERC and DOE decisions implementing the new 
transmission statutes enacted by Congress.65  This chilly judicial reception 
leaves FERC little regulatory authority to help guide the construction 
and cost recovery for high-voltage transmission lines.66 
 62. See Ashley Brown & Jim Rossi, Siting Transmission Lines in a Changed Milieu: 
Evolving Notions of the “Public Interest” in Balancing State and Regional Considerations, 
81 U. COLO. L. REV. 705 (2010). 
 63. Transmission Infrastructure: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Energy and Natural 
Resources, 111th Cong. 10 (2009). 
 64. See Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594, § 1221 
(2005) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 824p(b)). 
 65. Cal. Wilderness Coal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 631 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(rejecting DOE’s designation of critical congestion areas for purposes of FERC’s exercise of 
backstop authority); Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. FERC, 576 F.3d 470, 473, 478 (7th Cir. 
2009) (rejecting FERC’s approval of cost recover for a regional transmission 
entity); Piedmont Envtl. Council v. FERC, 558 F.3d 304, 325 (4th Cir. 2009) (rejecting 
FERC’s interpretation of the statutory criteria that triggers its backstop authority). 
 66. After Piedmont, the first judicial blow to FERC’s transmission line siting decisions, 
FERC Chairman Jon Wellinghoff testified before a Senate Committee, “[The Piedmont] 
court’s ruling is a significant constraint on the Commission’s already-limited ability to 
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One of these appellate decisions, from the Seventh Circuit, addresses 
the allocation of costs for new transmission lines under the FPA’s “just 
and reasonable” standard.67  Clear principles defining how costs for new 
transmission investments will be recovered is important to encouraging 
investment in such facilities, especially given the climate of regulatory 
uncertainty surrounding transmission line siting.  Following a model for 
cost allocation that had been adopted among members of the PJM 
Interconnection—a regional transmission organization (“RTO”)—FERC 
approved the RTO’s pro rata allocation of the costs among members for 
new 500 kilovolt (“kV”) and above transmission.  Because the 
RTO’s members span both concentrated and unconcentrated population 
areas, the direct benefit of transmission varied geographically across 
distinct customers groups within the PJM Interconnection region.  At the 
same time, there were recognized benefits of new 500 kV transmission 
to network reliability for all PJM Interconnection customers.  Consistent 
with its prior order approving the regionalization of the costs of 
transmission, FERC had not attempted to quantify these benefits across 
all of PJM’s members. 
In a serious blow to the efforts of sub-national entities to spread the 
costs of new transmission projects for clean energy, the Seventh Circuit 
reversed FERC’s approval of the PJM Interconnection cost allocation 
formula.  Writing for a majority of the panel, Judge Richard Posner 
concluded that “FERC is not authorized to approve a pricing scheme that 
requires a group of utilities to pay for facilities from which its members 
derive no benefits, or benefits that are trivial in relation to the costs 
sought to be shifted to its members.”68  While Judge Posner was careful 
to suggest that there is no need to calculate benefits “to the last penny,”69 
he also concluded that is insufficient for the agency to merely assert 
“some benefit” just because “a network is a network.”70  In Judge 
approve appropriate projects to transmit energy in interstate commerce.”  See Transmission 
Infrastructure: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 111th Cong. 
11 (2009) (statement of Jon Wellinghof, Acting Chairman, Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission).  Congress considered multiple proposals to enhance FERC’s authority to site 
and allocate costs for transmission lines, but these largely have faded along with discussion of 
comprehensive national climate change legislation.  See Jim Rossi, The Trojan Horse of 
Electric Power Transmission Line Siting Authority, 39 ENVTL. L. 1015 (2009). 
 67. See Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. FERC, 576 F.3d 470 (7th Cir. 2009) (rejecting 
FERC’s approval of regional cost spreading in approving pricing for a transmission line). 
 68. Id. at 476. 
 69. Id. at 477. 
 70. Id. 
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Posner’s view, to reflect the cost causation principle embedded in the 
FPA’s “just and reasonable” requirement, an effort needs to be made to 
either quantify such benefits or to conclude that the benefits are “roughly 
commensurate” with a utility’s share of sales in the entire PJM region.71  
Judge Posner’s approach emphasizes a narrow consumer protection 
principle—that all FERC approved rates must reflect the costs actually 
caused by the customer who pays for them—and treats the “just and 
reasonable” language in the FPA as a ceiling on any sub-national pricing 
for transmission that deviates from this principle. 
Judge Cudahy issued a strong dissent from this opinion, sketching out 
an entirely different vision for federal energy law.  He observed: 
[I]t is not possible to realistically determine for each utility and with reference 
to each major project the likelihood that rate-simplification will reduce litigation, or 
to calculate the precise value of not having to cover the costs of power failures 
and of not paying costs associated with congestion, and all this over the next forty to 
fifty years.  Concerns about the real value to individual utilities of the stability 
and efficiency provided by improvements to the backbone grid are answered 
by their voluntary participation in the power pool and its collaborative “RTEP” 
(or regional transmission expansion planning) process.  Rate-making based on cost 
causation is assured by this process, since universal cost-sharing is recommended 
only when developments are found to benefit the integrated system as a whole.72 
Judge Cudahy reasoned that imposing a precise quantification of benefits, or 
even rough proportionality, is inconsistent with past practice in regional grid 
pricing to address issues such as cascading outages, and is not required by 
any of FERC’s rules or precedents or the statutory language of the 
FPA.73  According to Judge Cudahy’s vision of energy law, the just and 
reasonable standard incorporates a broader range of values, including 
goals related to reliability and protecting the integrity of the system-wide 
grid as a whole.74  His approach arguably envisions the FPA’s just and 
reasonable standard as a floor, designed to encourage sub-national 
experimentation in pricing approaches, rather than as a ceiling that limits 
pricing and cost allocation innovations.75 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 479. 
 73. Id. at 480–82. 
 74. Id. at 481 (“The big picture here is that FERC’s proposal to spread the cost of 
very high voltage transmission [within the region] on a uniform basis seems to me in the 
interest of efficient, high-capacity transfer capability and of the closely linked improvement 
of reliability, which affects the system generally.”). 
 75. This point is elaborated in Jim Rossi & Thomas Hutton, Judge Cudahy’s 
Energy Vision, 29 YALE J. ON REG. (forthcoming 2012); see also Jim Rossi, Transmission 
Siting in Deregulated Wholesale Markets: Re-Imagining the Role of Courts in Resolving 
Federal-State Siting Impasses, 15 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 315 (2005) (suggesting a 
preemption approach as a way of overcoming the resistance of certain state institutions 
to approving the siting of new transmission lines). 
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In comparison to the strict cost causation approach of Judge Posner, a 
notable advantage of the PJM approach is that it would have encouraged 
greater investment in transmission lines by allowing investors to spread 
the costs of new lines more broadly.  Such an innovation would advance 
a federal goal by helping to overcome some of the obstacles to new 
transmission lines.  Transmission pricing thus provides a nice illustration 
of how floor preemption is not inconsistent with overcoming state 
protectionism.  In this context, a broader reading of the statute coupled 
along with treatment of the “just and reasonable” standard as a floor could 
help regional entities innovate to actually overcome state holdouts.76 
Another important pricing issue on the horizon for national energy 
policy is so-called “demand response,” or efforts by regulators to reduce 
the consumption of electricity.  Recently, FERC has adopted an innovative 
set of new policies regarding demand response.77  FERC’s demand response 
rules are highly complex but at core they set out to create incentives in 
the pricing of electric power that actually reduce the consumption of 
electricity, including the possibility that firms could be compensated not 
to purchase electricity in wholesale markets.  Much like a new transmission 
line, demand response can alleviate congestion and benefit the system as 
a whole, including reliability.  It also can advance values associated with 
conservation and environmental protection, insofar as reductions in demand 
may make new power plants unnecessary or allow plants to operate at 
more efficient levels.78  Given the enormous opportunity demand response 
presents to reduce demand and change investment decisions about new 
power plants and transmission lines, FERC Chairman Wellinghoff has 
described demand response as the “‘killer application’ of the smart grid.”79 
However, for FERC’s new demand response approach to survive legal 
challenges, the agency will likely need to depend on an expansive 
 76. On the advantage of regional entities in addressing renewable energy challenges, 
see Hannah Wiseman, Expanding Regional Renewable Governance, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2011). 
 77. See Order No. 745, Demand Response Compensation in Organized Wholesale 
Energy Markets, 134 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,187 (Mar. 1, 2011).    
 78. Although demand response has received little discussion, environmental law 
scholars have increasingly begun to recognize the significance of reducing demand and 
changing consumption patterns in advancing environmental goals.  See John C. Dernbach, 
Harnessing Individual Behavior to Address Climate Change: Options for Congress, 26 VA. 
ENVTL. L.J. 107 (2008); Michael P. Vandenbergh & Anne C. Steinman, The Carbon 
Neutral Individual, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1673 (2007). 




ROSSI - FINAL NO EDITS TO ACCEPT FROM AUTHOR (DO NOT DELETE) 1/15/2016  2:02 PM 
 
interpretation of the goals of the FPA as including not only consumer 
protection, but also reliability goals related to the system as a whole and 
conservation and environmental goals.80  Moreover, if FERC’s demand 
response pricing rules are interpreted as a ceiling under the FPA, state 
conservation approaches that require utilities to make conservation 
minded decisions in procuring wholesale power could be preempted if 
they require utilities to pay more than the rates FERC has approved.  By 
contrast, treating FERC’s demand response policies as a preemption 
floor would encourage state and other sub-national regulators to also 
innovate in conservation-minded approaches.  For example, a state 
approving a plan to compensate utilities not to purchase power in the 
wholesale market, instead reducing its demand through conservation 
programs, especially where the costs exceed the proportional payment 
plan FERC has approved in its demand response—so long as it does not 
present a direct obstacle to federal goals.81  An over eager ceiling 
preemption approach will limit states’ ability to reward utilities for their 
conservation practices and to innovate in other conservation measures.82 
There are, of course, some countervailing considerations that need to 
be assessed carefully as courts and regulators look to the diversity of 
values in federal energy law as embracing floor rather than ceiling 
preemption.  If Congress is clear that a singular value is to serve as a 
ceiling in a regulatory program, it seems appropriate that the agency and 
courts give full effect to Congress’s preference.  Even where Congress 
has endorsed multiple values in a federal statute, there will sometimes be 
a need for federal regulation to step in for the purpose of resolving 
conflicts as sub-national governments implement federal goals.  It also 
may be the case that uniformity of approach is necessary to advance a 
federal goal, but there is nothing in the history of federal power regulation 
that makes uniform pricing of wholesale markets a requirement. 
Perhaps most significantly, federal preemption and ceilings still can be 
appropriate where state regulation facilitates protectionism or states are 
 80. Although to date many conservation policies related to pricing, such as demand- 
side management, have been adopted by state regulators, in fact there is a long standing 
foundation in federal statutes for conservation policies as well.  See James W. Moeller, 
Electric Demand-Side Management Under Federal Law, 13 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 57 (1993). 
 81. Although it preceded FERC’s actual adoption of demand-response rules, for an 
excellent discussion of the possible preemption challenges to demand response, see Hon. 
Jon Wellinghoff & David L. Morenoff, Recognizing the Importance of Demand Response: 
The Second Half of the Wholesale Electric Market Equation, 28 ENERGY L.J. 389, 412–
19 (2007) (urging a coordinated federalism approach to demand response). 
 82. For example, FERC’s pro-preemption position under PURPA also could impact net 
metering.  The 2005 Energy Policy Act amended PURPA to require states to consider 
adopting net metering policies.  To the extent that states refer to PURPA avoided-cost rates in 
net metering statutes or regulations, FERC potentially could extend its price ceiling under the 
feed-in tariff orders to these policies as well. 
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in conflict with each other.  However, as I have suggested, the example 
of transmission pricing policy calls into question whether a risk of state 
protectionism requires ceiling preemption of prices, even in contexts 
where some individual states may historically have favored balkanized 
regulatory approaches and refused to site new lines.  Even where a state 
is externalizing some of these costs, if they advance federal goals, there 
is no preemption problem.  In the context of clean energy policy, it is 
certainly possible that protectionism and conflicts between the states 
could occur, and a need for federal resolution will sometimes be necessary.  
But with respect to most clean energy policies, where innovation is the 
rule and not the exception, it would be premature for courts and regulators 
to eagerly impose ceiling preemption on state innovations, especially 
where they are relatively small scale and are designed to advance goals 
that are co-extensive with the diverse values of federal energy law. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The New Deal price regulation relic of ceiling preemption in setting 
prices has invited FERC and courts to emphasize the singular policy of 
consumer protection at the expense of the diversity of goals endorsed in 
federal energy statutes.  A recognition of federal energy law’s polyphonic 
goals would lead courts and regulators to more frequently adopt a floor 
preemption approach, allowing federal regulators to more effectively 
serve as a lever for investment and innovation at the regional, state, and 
local levels. 
As with PURPA, often a single statute will embrace multiple goals, 
including competition, conservation, fuel diversity, and efficiency.  
Focus on a singular purpose or objective at the expense of other goals 
may have been sufficient to advance energy policy in the past, but a 
national clean energy policy requires regulators and courts to embrace a 
balance of multiple policies.  In the case of FERC’s preemption policy 
regarding feed-in tariffs, emphasizing a single purpose of market 
competition in preemption has hobbled the ability of states to further the 
other goals of PURPA, such as conservation and fuel diversity.  Much 
energy policy is adopted against the backdrop of multiple statutes 
embracing multiple goals—a true polyphonic statutory interpretation 
scenario.  Even statutes like the FPA that historically might have 
embraced a singular purpose, such as protecting consumers, today are 
implemented against a tapestry of laws that import a diversity of values 
into the statute’s implementation.  In the context of reviewing transmission 
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line siting and cost allocation decisions, courts have failed to recognize 
the diverse range of goals behind national energy law.  If a similar 
approach is taken elsewhere, this also will limit the ability of federal 
agencies to implement policies designed to reduce the demand for 
electricity. 
Finally, to the extent that regulators themselves read their statutes 
narrowly and impose price preemption ceilings, even where making 
narrow decisions, this circumstance also invites the judiciary’s eagerness 
to project narrow goals and preemption ceilings onto federal energy 
law—hobbling the broader ability of the federal government to spur sub-
national innovation to advance a clean energy agenda.  If FERC’s approach 
to statutory interpretation in assessing feed-in tariffs were widely applied 
by federal courts in evaluating FERC’s other clean energy pricing policies, 
the agency’s ability to adopt clean energy policies—including transmission 
pricing and demand response—will be in serious peril.  A consistent 
approach that recognizes the diverse values of federal statutes, allowing 
courts and regulators to imagine federal law as a floor rather than a ceiling, 
would be more likely to give federal energy law the space it needs to 
encourage regional entities and state and local governments to innovate 
in clean energy policy. 
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